STATEMENT OF DICK SMITH
I, DICK SMITH of Terrey Hills in the State of New South Wales, say as follows:-
1. I have held a Pilot's Licence since 1972. In 1983 I obtained my command instrument rating. In 1991 I obtained approval to fly jet aircraft as a single pilot. I presently have 9,000 hours as pilot in command.
2. In 1988 I was appointed to the Board of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which was the predecessor of Air Services Australia and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. In 1989 I was appointed Chairman of the CAA Board. At this time the CAA was responsible for both aviation safety regulation and air traffic control. During my tenure as Chairman, the Board and Management of CAA made major policy decisions, the most significant of which were a re-organisation of air space: the two divisions of controlled and non-controlled air space were re-classified to adopt an international air space system where airspace was classified according to a number of factors, including the services provided to pilots and to maximise the use of radar. The other significant policy decision that was taken was the centralisation of air traffic services to Brisbane and Melbourne so that there are now only two major centres. With these changes were the implementation of an air traffic system which had a proven design features. The system became known as "The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System" or "TAAATS".
4. In 1997 I served as Chairman of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and from 2002 to 2004 I was a member of the Minister's Aviation Regulation Review Task Force.
5. For a very long period I have been concerned about aviation safety and in particular accidents involving what are called, a controlled flight into terrain, such as occurred with VH- TNP. From my experience as a pilot and through serving on the Board of the CAA and CASA, I have reached the view that many of these accidents might have been averted if some relatively simple changes initiated during my tenure on the Board of CAA had been finalised. The issues which arise with respect to the Benalla accident of an aircraft flying into terrain whilst flying an approach are common to many other accidents in this country. Indeed there are in the order of 275 aerodromes in Australia which have a non precision approach procedure such as is the case at Benalla.
6. I have examined the circumstances of the Benalla accident including reading the various reports, speaking to other pilots who knew Kerry Endicott and I have flown along the actual approach taken by VH-TNP (as far as it can be ascertained from the information available) to the actual crash site. I have also written about aviation safety in my book Unsafe Skies and the Benalla accident in particular. In chapter 11 of that publication, which is attached to this Statement and marked "A", I examine the Benalla accident.
7. I am aware that prior to the accident when the aircraft was enroute to Benalla, route adherence monitor alarms sounded three times in the Air Traffic Control Radar Centre in Melbourne, but were not acted upon. I further understand from my research that Air Services Australia has quite properly taken steps following the TNP accident and made changes to instructions and in relation to training to address the issue of controllers responding to RAM alerts. I would call this, rectifying "the lateral problem"; that is, where an aircraft strays from track beyond a particular tolerance there should now be a corrective response from ATC. However, "the vertical problem" where an airliner, or a general aviation aircraft descends from controlled air space to into G air space below lowest safe altitude (LSALT) without the benefit of any assistance from ATC to operate clear of terrain remains an important safety issue which in my respectful opinion is directly relevant to the Inquest and the causes of the VH-TNP accident, and has not yet been addressed by Air Services Australia.
8. I note from the ATSB report examining the accident that the last radar paint was at approximately 27 miles from Benalla. Within 25 nautical miles from Benalla the minimum safe altitude in that sector is 5,000 feet. Outside that 25 miles radius the minimum safe altitude is 7,100 feet.
9. I note further that there were communications with the pilot of VH-TNP at 10.42 EST when the aircraft was going through 6,100 feet. At that point I estimate that the aircraft was well below LSALT, and probably about 1,000 feet below LSALT.
10. From my experience with the TAAATS system I understand that the TAAATS software has the facility (if additional terrain data is loaded) such that controllers would receive an alarm where an aircraft descends through the LSALT. This would be one option for addressing the "vertical problem" to which I refer; the airspace changes to which I refer in annexure A to this statement would also reduce the risk of CFIT accidents such as VH-TNP.
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DICK SMITH
Dated 7 August 2008
