15 July 2008

Mr Mark O’Brien

Partner

Johnson Winter & Slattery

Level 30, 264 George St

SYDNEY  NSW  2000

Dear Mr O’Brien

OAR’s Aeronautical Study of Avalon dated May 2008

We refer to your correspondence of 25 June 2008 on behalf of Mr Dick Smith relating to this issue.

It is clear from that correspondence that Mr Smith’s personal opinion concerning the nature and extent of the Air Traffic Control service required at Avalon Airport differs from the determination on this issue made by the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) on the basis of the Avalon Aeronautical Study.

The fourth paragraph of your letter indicates that Mr Smith has obtained advice from ‘experts’ supporting his opinion.  Given the circumstances of your correspondence, we are surprised that these experts are not named, that their credentials are not provided and that we have not been provided with a copy of their assessments.

On page 2 of the preamble to your letter, under ‘Background’, the second paragraph presents certain assertions as if they are established facts.  However, there was and is no ‘widespread concern and dissatisfaction’ with the Airservices Avalon Study of 2006.  The third paragraph contains a further error of fact, stating that there are no air traffic services provided in Class G airspace.  Mr Smith should be well aware that this is not true.

In the summary paragraph under ‘Significant deficiencies and omissions…’ the un-named expert technical advisers have apparently misled Mr Smith in that:

• the OAR has in fact carried out a risk management review consistent, as far as possible, with the draft Common Risk Management Framework (CRMF);
• the cost benefit analysis is valid and limitations are explained;
• the OAR consulted widely and transparently with all stakeholders; and
• the OAR believes it has complied with the specifications of the Australian Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) of 2007.

Turning now to the address the four matters of concern to Mr Smith which were expanded upon in your letter:

1.      “Common Risk Management Framework and Methodology”

Currently the OAR is indeed obliged to abide by the draft CRMF but this document is under review by the CRMF Working Group as it is considered to require further development.  The current draft stipulates that OAR must use the Airspace Safety Levels, Assessment and Monitoring model (ASLAM) to assess mid-air collision risk.  However, as this tool is at present not available, the ‘multi-faceted’ approach or methodology listed below has been applied by the OAR combining the following tools to assess airspace risk/safety level:

• generative interviews;
• a thread barrier model; and
• an historic review process utilising the Airspace Risk Model (ARM).

The process to conduct generative interviews with stakeholders and the development of the threat barrier model has been developed by a consultant who recently applied this model assisting the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to implement a similar process of risk analysis and management.

The ARM is a cause-consequence model and is used to calculate the probability of midair collisions in various airspace environments.  This model was reviewed, during the mid 1990s, by an industry Safety Panel which consisted of a dozen expert personnel with current high experience levels as domestic and regional airline pilots, flying instructors with aero clubs, military pilots, civil and military air traffic controllers and CASA Flying Operations Inspectors.  Careful and thorough comparison of the ARM and the FAA collision formula indicate that, for both controlled and uncontrolled terminal areas, the results were similar.  That is, the results of the ARM have been validated against the FAA model which is the basis of the risk component underpinning FAA-APO-90-7.

The 1.25 LOC introduced to the threat barrier model (page 6) was proposed by R2A and based on the generative interviews and their own experience with similar studies.  It is important to note that the generative interviews clearly indicated that the current airspace was unsatisfactory and that CASA had to act to make the airspace safer.  The LOC figure is also supported by the four TCAS RA incidents that were reported to the ATSB for Avalon during the 6 months preceding the study.

We interpret from your letter that Mr Smith’s risk and cost benefit analysis (supported by unnamed experts) leads him to believe that Class D airspace is appropriate for Avalon and that Class D airspace be managed / controlled by a Tower (meaning Aerodrome Control Service) in a Class D Control Zone.  Furthermore, it is contended that the application of the FAA cost-benefit criteria in FAA-APO-90-7 would support this conclusion.

The Study makes clear that one of the major risks in the airspace surrounding Avalon is the conflict of VFR traffic with IFR heavy jet movements several nautical miles away from the aerodrome itself.  This information was obtained from both the generative interviews and an examination of ATSB incident reports.  Interestingly, this was also the finding of the 2006 Airservices Australia Study.  The most effective mitigation of that risk is the application of positive control – i.e. separation of – the VFR aircraft in the area from the IFR movements.  The services specified for Class D airspace do not include the separation of VFR aircraft from IFR aircraft which includes the jet passenger transport aircraft and instrument training operations.

2.      “Inadequate Cost-Benefit Analysis”

With regard to the Cost Benefit Analysis it is important to mention that the cost figures used in the calculations were supplied by Airservices Australia. The traffic figures in the cost benefit analysis can be confirmed with the aerodrome operator, via AvData information.  All other date is obtainable from the web pages supplied in the Study or can be obtained from this Office if required.

It is, however, important to note that the only information that was withheld from the Study was the number of movements of specific operators to Avalon.  This was done at the request of the operators and is clearly stated in the Study.  This observation of Commercial-in-Confidence data is in keeping with the manner in which all government agencies deal with information obtained in such circumstances.

Significantly, FAA-APO-90-7 states very clearly that the basis of the cost-benefit criteria therein has been changed in that current documentation from the earlier use of aircraft numbers as a component of the calculations, to using passenger numbers (i.e. actual lives at risk).  It is these numbers that were provided on the condition of commercial confidentiality and therefore only publically available information through media releases etc was used.

After some deliberation, it was decided that the cost to general aviation was negligible in the calculation because VFR traffic would still receive a clearance as required to operate in or transit Avalon airspace in the majority of cases.  Clearance would only be restrictive when there was a conflict with RPT traffic.  Hence the cost of potential delay was insignificant.  The cost of fitting transponders to 10 aircraft per year was included in the cost benefit analysis.  This cost is negligible when considering the benefit which is returned in safety terms and the number of passenger lives saved.  However, the majority of stakeholders did not have experience of nil transponder aircraft operating in the vicinity of Avalon.  Only one stakeholder reported operating an aircraft which was not transponder equipped and it was not routinely used outside of the uncontrolled aerodrome at which it was based.  Therefore, the number of aircraft likely to be affected by the activation of Class C airspace who do not meet the equipment carriage requirements is estimated to be extremely low.

With regard to the reference to depreciation (page 7) it must be mentioned that an attempt was made to exclude depreciation.  Information supplied by Airservices Australia to CASA indicated that to run a tower at Avalon, costs would compare to Launceston and should be estimated at $2.5 million – this figure included an amount for depreciation.  As OAR was concerned about the inclusion of depreciation in the operating cost figure, an amount of $1.0 million dollars per annum was subtracted from the operational cost. This revised value of $1.5 million was applied in the cost benefit analysis and is reflected in the row “Operational costs – Tower” of Annex E.

3.      “Lack of transparency and adequacy of Consultation”

As explained above, the Airservices Australia data has not been withheld.

The third paragraph of your letter indicates that Mr Smith has been mis-informed.  In particular, AOPA were advised of the pending Avalon study at the Airspace Consultative Forum attended by the AOPA CEO and a representative of RAAus.  A briefing was given with an invitation to any interested party to participate. This was followed by a brief at the Victorian Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee (RAPAC) attended by the AOPA Director of Airspace Issues amongst many others.

Information was also placed on the OAR web site from December 2007 advising of the study; this information was routinely updated as the project progressed.  Contact details via telephone and e-mail were provided for any individuals or organisations to utilise to provide input.

4.      “Acting inconsistently with the government’s 2007 Policy Statement”

The summary points listed here are a mis-representation of the AAPS, namely:

a)      the Policy statement directs a risk and cost benefit based approach to regulation:  Not simply to copy the US NAS;

b)      the valid cost benefit analysis was not conducted by R2A but by the OAR in accordance with the intent of the APS; and

c)      the OAR has met its ‘obligations’ for consultation.

Conclusion

In reply to the requests at the conclusion of your letter:

(a)   CASA disagrees that there are multiple problems and deficiencies (in or) created by the May Study that require dealing with;

(b)   CASA does not intend to conduct a Supplementary Study, nor engage an un-named expert purportedly familiar with FAA methodology for an opinion of classification airspace at Avalon;

(c)   CASA is not prepared to classify the Airspace as Class D for all the reasons explained in the Aeronautical Study.

Yours sincerely

Peter Cromarty

General Manager

Airspace and Aerodrome Regulation Group

CC     Malcolm McGregor, OAR