Dick Smith Flyer
For a free copy of the "Unsafe Skies" book, either email us, or download it from this page.

Contact Dick Smith Flyer

Links: Air Safety Australia | AOPA | AGACF
PPRuNe | Recreational Flying | The Aussie Aviator

Number of visits:


Flyer home page 
 
 Introduction
 
 Benalla Coronial Inquest
 
 Minister's Class C radar directive
 
 Air Traffic Control Culture?
 
 Reviews of the "Ambidji GAAP Report"
 
 Newcastle Airport
 
 $50,000 Seasprite offer
 
 Avalon Airport
 
 Safer circuit procedures
 
 Aiming Higher
 
 Flightwatch closure
 
 ADS-B
 
 Class E airspace
 
 Safety Incidents
 
 PPRuNe
 
 National Airspace System (NAS) Document
 
 Government NAS & statements
 
 Airline safety rating brochure
 
 Flying as a career
 
 Humour
 
 Dick Smith's CV
 
 Dick Smith's Life Story
 
 Important Information on Launceston Air Incident
Search

AiRCHIVES : 2000 Last Updated: Jul 19th, 2010 - 10:01:18


Raytheon does not agree with ATSB recommendation
By Dick Smith
Oct 6, 2000, 10:13

Email this article
 Printer friendly page

Raytheon does not agree with ATSB recommendation

The ATSB/BASI report about the King Air VH-OYA incident (where the aircraft climbed to 25,000’ with the bleed air not turned on and the oxygen masks failing to drop) does not make any comment on the training of the pilot or the competence of the maintenance company. Instead the ATSB criticised the certification and manufacture of the aircraft by stating there should be an audible alert in addition to the two existing visual warnings.

The BASI web site gave the answer from Raytheon, the manufacturers of the Beech aircraft. Raytheon state the following.

“Therefore, in the case of the subject incident, even though the pressurization system was not turned on, the pilot would have been presented with a red flashing light and a red “ALT WARN” when the cabin altitude exceeded 12,500 feet. These two warnings are more than adequate and meet the certification requirements of the Model B200. There are over 1,600 Model 200 King Airs in operation worldwide with this system installed. Raytheon Aircraft does not believe it is necessary to add aural warning to an already proven visual system.”

It is interesting that the ATSB response status states, “Closed – Not Accepted.”

The original ATSB report of the incident fails to explain why the two pilots on the flight deck did not see either of the two warnings. No comment is made in relation to the angle of the sun, reflections which may have been present, nor whether the warning system was working or not.

If anyone has any information, please let me know.


 




Top of Page